Summary 

Georgia has witnessed a sharp decline in fertility after obtaining independence, namely, since the beginning of the 1990s. During more than the last three decades the total fertility rate lagged behind the level necessary for the replacement level fertility within four years out of every five. If the mentioned rate had been on the level sufficient for the replacement level fertility (2.1) 272 thousand more children (more by 18.4%) than the actual figure would have been born in Georgia. In other words, the figure would have been substantially higher than the number of individuals currently living in the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

The main goal of the research is to manifest and analyze the demographic factors which influence the decline in fertility and formulate recommendations by juxtaposing two generations of reproductive age.

In addition to the theoretical-methodological issues concerning fertility, the article also makes use of the official demographic data from GeoStat as well as the analysis of the selective survey with regard to the demographic situation existing in the Georgian family. The survey was conducted by the Iliauni Institute of Demography and Sociology in May-June of 2023; the scope of the sociological survey encompassed the capital of Georgia and all the regions of the country. In total, 1891 respondents were interviewed. Among them 605 (32.0%) were men and 1286 (68%) – women. Furthermore, the share of the interviewed individuals within the total number of the respondents was maximally close to the share of the population in the given region within the total population of Georgia.

The study of the alteration of fertility level, especially in the long-term, is based on the information concerning the live-born and on the correlation dynamic of the number of women aged 15-49. It can be asserted that the period between 1959-1992 was stable in terms of demography and was characterized by evolutionary development, which was mainly determined by demographic factors. In particular, the increase in the number of the women of fertile age born in the 1950s encouraged the stabilization of fertility at the high level during the “Baby Boom” and subsequent years (1970-1990). However, despite the increase, the number of births was declining in Georgia. Since 1990, together with the tendency of the decrease of fertile women, it has been diminishing even more in the successive years. By 2022, as compared with 1959, the fertility level decreased 2 times, against the background of a 10%-reduction of the number of women aged 15-49 in Georgia.

After the inner-family regulation of births, the actual level of fertility was lower than the level of natural fertility, that is, the potential of fertility remained to be realized fully. The latter can be very high, but the existing level of fertility is dependent on the rate of its realization. The indicators of the hypothetical minimum of natural fertility show to what extent the reproductive potential of the Georgian women was realized during 1958-2020. The calculations manifested that as a consequence of the changes in the reproductive behavior brought about by the second demographic transition in 1990-2000, 807.8 thousand children would have been born as opposed to 117.6 thousand less, were it not for the decrease in the intensity of fertility. Moreover, 62.3% of the decrease of the born children was determined by the changes occurring in the reproductive behavior whereas 37.7% fell to the deterioration of the age structure.

It follows from the Coale indices that the decline in fertility during 1959-1970 was determined by the increase of the inner-family regulation of births, whereas in the 1970s it was caused more by the deterioration of the marriage structure.

As opposed to the years of 1970-1979, during 1979-1989 the general fertility index was decreasing. Compared to it, during the same 1979-1989 the marriage fertility index was decreasing more and was less than the indicator of 1970-1979. The tendency of its reduction would have continued were it not for the improvement of the marriage condition of the population in the 1980s (the share of the married women of fertile age increased).

The 1990s were unprecedented in terms of the change of the intensity of births. From 1989 to 1999, for the duration of ten years, the Coale index for total births declined by nearly the same figure as during the previous 30 years, from 1959 to 1989. Moreover, as the Coale index for marital births reflects the changes occurring within reproductive behavior, its decline was more important than the decrease of the index of total fertility. At the same time, the share of the index of the fertile married women decreased substantially, which speaks to the deterioration of structural changes.

The Coale index for out-of-wedlock births increased during the 1990s. in 1999, it approached the figure of the index of marriage fertility. Therefore, the Coale indices confirm that the decrease in fertility in Georgia was caused more by the changes occurring in reproductive behavior and less by the deterioration of the marriage structure of the population.

It is clear from the Coale index for total births that during 2000-2014 the mentioned index grew from 0.105 to 0.188 and reached the maximum figure in 2014. This means that the inner-family regulation of fertility decreased during these years. Despite the fact that the women of fertile age migrated to foreign countries, the intensity of fertility increased, as a result of which during 2010-2020 the existing depopulation was replaced by the replacement level fertility. This short-term “demographic improvement” of 20 years was caused by the initiative of Georgia’s Patriarch, according to which, every third and successive children were to be baptized by him. This, together with fighting against abortions, appeared as the unique measure of demographic policy. As a result of increase of the number of third and successive children the structure of fertility changed in favor of the third and successive children, however, the share of the first and second children in the total number of births decreased. This signifies that the increase in fertility is primarily the result of the postponed childbirth of the women aged above 30. The afore-mentioned has substantially increased the average age of mothers at the time of birth of any consecutive child during 2005 and 2021. In 2021, the average age of mothers during the birth of every child was 3.1 years more than the figure in 2005, whereas the average age of mothers during the birth of the first child in 2021 exceeded 2.2 times the figure of 2005 and amounted to 26.2 years.

After 2000 the number of abortions more or less decreased. For example, the researches of the women’s reproductive health conducted in Georgia show that the total rate of abortions during 1997-2010 declined from 2.7 to 1.6. The same researches make clear that the correlation between abortions and fertility during 1999-2010 decreased from 2:1 to 0.8:1. This means that the number of the live-born children in 2010 exceeded the number of the abortions for the first time.

During 1990-2020, under the conditions of decreased reproductive potential of Georgia caused by emigration, the collapse of the demographic situation brought about only by the reproductive behavior was less plausible, as it was significantly influenced by non-demographic factors as well (political, socio-economic, etc.).

It must be noted that the decline in the consecutiveness of the born children was mainly determined by the development of children-centrism formed in families since the 1980s, which, itself, is the consequence of the second demographic transition.

The priority of having less children rather than a large number of kids in families is noticeable during this period. This was determined by the placement of the value of having children in the back seats as opposed to material and other social values which existed in the families’ system of needs. Families put more emphasis on the qualitative care of children (education, career, sport, culture, etc.) instead of their quantity. Families with many children could not provide the necessary funds for the qualitative upbringing of their children. This fostered the emergence of the families with small number of kids, which continues even today.

Naturally, there emerges a question: what caused the decrease of fertility in Georgia? Was it more due to the law of change of reproductive behavior or to some non-demographic factors (socio-economic, etc.). We believe that were it not for the deterioration of the political (civil war, dissolution of territorial integrity, occupation, etc.) and socio-economic situation in the country together with the concurrent increase in the migratory processes, even under the conditions of the low level of reproductive behavior (approaching the replacement fertility level), we could have expected less demographic losses.

The research conducted by the Iliauni Institute of Demography and Sociology showed that after 1995 within the 44.2% of the born respondents’ families there was not a single child aged below 16. The quantity of such respondents was especially high in the families of the respondents aged 16-19, within more than half of which (52.2%) there was not a single child aged under 16. This points to the fact that during the last 20 years not a single child has been born within more than the half of these respondents’ families. As for the respondents whose families could boast of children aged under 16, the total rate of fertility was, on average, only 1.55. Even within the families of the respondents aged 30-39, whose age is the best in terms of fertility and childbirth, the total rate of fertility amounts to 1.75, which means depopulation and is not enough even for the replacement level fertility (2.15) to say nothing of the total rate of fertility (2.6) necessary for the replacement level fertility within families.

According to the respondents’ opinion, the optimal (expected) number of the children born in the family is, on average, 2.74. This figure exceeds the number of the kids necessary for the replacement fertility level for every woman (2.15) as well as the necessary quantity of the born children in the family (2.6 children).

The sociological survey has shown that the respondent men and women have the identical opinion on the optimal number of children (2.74). Moreover, the optimal number of the children mentioned by them exceeds the number of the children within their parents’ families, however, with little difference – there were more children within the women respondents’ families than within that of the men. Furthermore, 2.1 percent of the respondents did not express a wish to have any children, whereas, for the rest 97.9 percent, who wanted to have children, the average number nearly coincided with the number of the children in their parents’ families (2.47 and 2.46). Moreover, the male respondents wanted to have more children than the number existing in their parents’ families, whereas, the females, on the contrary, expressed a wish to have less children. The parents of the respondents, both male and female, actually had an equal number of children (on average, in one family – 1.96 children). The fact that the female respondents were cautious about the number of the children in their families as opposed to the men respondents might, to some degree, be explained by the burden placed on the shoulders of the females when caring for, bringing up and educating their children as well as the emotional and physical pressures experienced by them.

More than 2/5 (41.3%) of the respondents did not wish to have more children in the future. From among them, who answered the question positively, on average, 1.96 children fell to each such respondent. However, if we apportion the figure of having additional children to the total number of the respondents, taking into account that the share of the respondents who have children is only 56.1 percent, it follows that, on average, for a single woman the potential of the increase of the quantity of children is only 0.55 children. Taking into consideration the actual figure (1.10 children per one woman), the received figure of 1.65 children per one woman (=1.10 + 0.55) still significantly lags behind the replacement fertility level for every thousand head (2.1 children), to say nothing of the necessary figure in the family to this end (2.6 children).

 The most important factor among others is the material one when considering the number of desired children for the respondents. 30.7 percent of the respondents deem this indicator to be crucial. The said figure exceeds 1.5 times such an important factor as is a family (22.2%), which takes the second place. It is noteworthy that according to the material situation, the said figure was somewhat higher among the male respondents than among the females (respectively, 35.0% and 28.1%). How many children should a family have in order to improve the demographic situation or even provide the replacement fertility level?

Under the conditions of depopulation in Georgia, in 2022, without taking into account the net migration, if Georgia was to provide the zero level of populations’ natural movement (replacement fertility level), it should have been necessary that 7121 (16.8%) more children were born in Georgia than is the actual number. According to the survey, the increase in the number of the first-born children must provide the burden to overcome the said demographic deficit. Based on the demographic data of 2022, if it was necessary to increase the rate of fertility by 16.8% in order to overcome the deficit, the increase in the number of the first-born children among the general number of the born should have been 18.6%.

Is this possible? In order to answer this question, we must take into account many socio-economic and psychological factors. Among them the fact that a sharp decline in the fertility rate was reflected not only in the decrease of the absolute figure and its qualitative worsening, but also in the one more anti-record that was encountered in 2022. Namely, if during 1994-2022 the correlation between the first-born children and the number of marriages amounted to 110.3%, the said figure reached the historical minimum in 2022 – 63.5%.If we consider the fact that a large number of the youth avoids the civil (registered) marriage and limit themselves to only the ecclesiastical marriage, the correlation between the first-born children and the actual (civil plus ecclesiastical) figure must be still lower in reality.

For the replacement fertility level, the number of the first-born children among the born kids, according to the data of 2022, must have been approximately 3.1 thousand more. In this case, the correlation between the first-born children with the number of marriages in 2022 would have increased from the actual 63.5% up to 75.4%, that is, it would have reprised the previous figure in 2021 (2021 = 74.3%).

The presented simulated version offers us an opportunity to imagine to what extent the fertility rates must increase in order to reach the zero level of natural movement. Additionally, if we take into consideration the fact that Georgia still retains the trend of negative net migration (the negative net migration of the Georgian citizens in 2022 exceeded nearly by 4.5 thousand the quantity of the children born in our country), in order to level the latter trend, it is necessary to achieve the qualitatively high level of fertility and on the part of the Georgian state, to implement a more active and large-scale demographic policy as opposed to the currently existing one.